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F
ollowing the issue by the Galileo Service Center of the 
Notice Advisory to Galileo Users (NAGU) reporting 
Service Outage for all the Galileo satellites, as curi-
ous Galileo users our team of researchers of the Nav-
SAS group started an independent investigation of the received 
signals in space (SISs). 
In fact, we observed that a commercial u-blox EVK-M8T 
receiver, forced to use Galileo-only satellites, provided  a 
“no-fix” indication. Three Galileo-enabled smartphones, 
the Xiaomi MI 8, Huawei P10 and Samsung Galaxy S8, 
which use assistance from the cellular network, were also 
not providing a Galileo-based position solution, considering 
the Galileo satellites as “not usable.”
However, the investigation started exploiting our in-
house developed software receiver NGene, that was used 
in the past for similar monitoring of the GNSS signals, for 
example at the time of the transmission of the first IOV 
Galileo satellites in 2012, and the transmission of anomalous 
G
alileo Initial Services have been restored after 
a week-long signal outage, according to a 
statement released on July 18 by the European 
GNSS Agency (GSA).
“Commercial users can already see signs of recovery of 
the Galileo navigation and timing services...although some 
fluctuations may be experienced until further notice.”
After the signal outage began on July 11, efforts to restore 
services reportedly found a malfunction in the calculation 
of time and orbit predictions (ephemeris).
Why the error affected both Precise Timing Facilities 
(PTFs) within the Galileo ground control system, at Fucino 
in Italy and Oberpfaffenhoffen in Germany, has not been 
explained. System redundancy in the form of these doubled 
facilities was meant to prevent such breakdowns.
The GSA statement continues: “Galileo Initial Services 
have now been restored. Commercial users can already 
see signs of recovery of the Galileo navigation and timing 
services, although some fluctuations may be experienced 
until further notice.
“The technical incident originated by an equipment 
malfunction in the Galileo ground infrastructure, affecting 
the calculation of time and orbit predictions, and which are 
used to compute the navigation message. The malfunction 
affected different elements on the ground facilities.
“A team composed of GSA [European GNSS Agency]
experts, industry, ESA [European Space Agency] and 
[European] Commission worked together 24/7 to address 
the incident. The team is monitoring the quality of Galileo 
services to restore Galileo timing and navigation services 
at their nominal levels.
“We will set an Independent Inquiry Board to identify 
the root causes of the major incident. This will allow the 
Commission, as the programme manager, together with 
the EU Agency GSA to draw lessons for the management 
of an operational system with several millions of users 
worldwide.”
On July 22, the GSA issued a further Notice Advisory to 
Galileo Users (NAGU) consisting of four words: “The service 
is restored.” Full statements of all NAGUS issued during the 
crisis are available on the GSA website. 
Galileo Restores Service 
after Week’s Outage Analysis of the Signal Outage
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GPS signals from SVN49 in 2009. 
Monitoring the Galileo SISs, which 
were usable until the day before, we 
found that they were still correctly 
trackable, with normal power levels 
and Doppler profiles within feasible 
limits. 
At the time of the first analysis, 
seven satellites were visible in the sky 
over Torino, Italy. FIGURE 1 reports a 
screenshot of the positions computed 
by means of NGene between 07:14:54 
and 07:24:54 UTC on July 15, plotted 
on Google Earth. The position 
estimated using the Galileo-only 
satellite or hybrid GPS-Galileo 
solutions (red dots) showed errors 
on the order of 500 meters or even 
more. The georeferenced antenna 
position is depicted by the green pin.
The monitoring of the status flags 
taken from the Galileo E1B I/NAV 
message showed that the SIS was 
marked as “healthy” for all the visible 
PRNs apart the number 14, which is 
known to be “not usable” for a long 
time. The Signal in Space Accuracy 
Index (SISA) was set to 109, which 
is an acceptable prediction of the 
minimum standard deviation of an 
overbound of the SIS error. 
According to the Galileo Open 
S e r v i c e  “ S e r v i c e  D e f i n i t i o n 
Document” (OS SDD, issued 1.1, 
May 2019), a SIS “healthy” means 
that the SIS is expected to meet the 
Minimum Performance Level, and 
“a navigation solution obtained 
with Galileo SIS is expected to meet 
the Minimum Performance Levels 
reported in the Galileo OS SDD 
only if receivers comply with the 
assumptions reported in Section 
2.4, including the use of navigation 
parameters within their broadcast 
period.”
In fact, the document specifies that 
“The navigation solution is expected 
to meet the Minimum Performance 
Levels only if receivers do not use 
navigation parameters beyond their 
broadcast period. The maximum 
nominal broadcast period of a 
healthy navigation message data set 
is currently 4 hours.”
The check of the nominal broadcast 
period was bypassed in our software 
receiver, which is indented as a 
research tool and not a commercial 
product as the one mentioned above, 
so that we were still able to obtain a 
GPS + Galileo PVT solution, since 
this check looked to be the only 
discrimination factor to validate and 
thus exclude the computed solution. 
On July 17, the SISA flag was 
changed to 255: according to the 
OS SDD, the accuracy status was 
“No Accuracy Prediction Available 
(NAPA).” This means that the status 
of the broadcast SIS must be intended 
as “Marginal.” In this condition the 
EVK-M8T restarted to provide 
Galileo-based fixes, while the Xiaomi 
Mi 8 Pro smartphone still excluded 
the Galileo satellites from its PVT fix.
The analysis  of  the   decoded 
Galileo navigation message  led to 
the conclusion that ephemerides 
and clock correction data were last 
updated around 19:00 UTC of July 16. 
For example, PRN 3 and 15 changed 
Issue Of Data (IOD) from 958 to 17 at 
Galileo Signal Time TOW 241855, 
which corresponds to 19:01:25. 
As a final check, we used external 
ephemerides to process the Galileo 
signals during the “system outage.” 
FIGURE 2 and FIGURE 3 show different 
navigation solutions obtained by 
processing a data collection taken 
on July 12 at 10.00 UTC (12.00 Local 
time). The purple dots indicate few 
fixes obtained by demodulating the 
navigation message transmitted by 
the Galileo satellites and show a 
remarkable bias with regard to the 
reference antenna location. 
F         Comparison of Galileo-only solutions using Navigation message ephemeris data and 
IGS ephemeris.
S   GALILEO OUTAGE,        . >>
Only the 
ephemerides 
updates were 
affected by 
problems.
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T
he second next-generation 
GPS III satellite, nicknamed 
“Magellan” by the U.S. Air 
Force,  is poised on the 
launchpad, ready to rise into space 
on August 23.
Lockheed Martin Space and United 
Launch Alliance (ULA) technicians 
encapsulated GPS III SV02 in its launch 
fairings in late June, and mounted it 
atop a ULA Delta IV rocket in early July. 
“GPS III SV02 is launching just a 
brisk seven months after the nation’s 
first GPS III satellite lifted off back in 
December,” said Johnathon Caldwell, 
Lockheed Martin’s vice president 
for Navigation Systems. “The first 
satellite’s performance during on-orbit 
testing has exceeded expectations.”
GPS III satellite production and launch 
cadence is picking up. On May 27, the 
Air Force declared the next GPS III 
satellite, GPS III SV03, available for 
launch pending an official launch date.
“More GPS III satellites are coming,” 
Caldwell said. “If you looked at our 
production line back in Denver today, 
you would see GPS III space vehicles 
04, 05 and 06 already fully assembled 
and in various stages of testing. And 
space vehicles 07 and 08 are being 
built up at the component assembly 
level now.”  
Lockheed Martin is under contract 
to develop and build up to 32 GPS III/
IIIF satellites for the Air Force.
Additional GPS IIIF capabilities 
will start being added with the 11th 
GPS III satellite. These will include 
a fully digital navigation payload, a 
Regional Military Protection (RMP) 
capability, an accuracy-enhancing laser 
retroreflector array, and a search-and-
rescue payload.
GALILEO OUTAGE
GPS III SV02 Will Soon Rise
In FIGURE 3, the green dots are the navigation solution 
obtained correcting the satellites positions according to 
precise orbits data and clock drift provided by the IGS 
network. The fix  is a simple code-based Least Mean 
Square solution without smoothing of the pseudoranges.
The two results were obtained by processing the same 
satellites signals, thus proving that their quality was still 
sufficient to get an acceptable positioning solution during 
the Galileo service outage period. This brought us to the 
conclusion that, during the outage, only the ephemerides 
updates were affected by problems, while the other SIS 
components appeared sound and usable.
The NavSAS group is a joint team of researchers of 
Politecnico di Torino and LINKS foundation. The full 
analysis of the outage can be found at www.navsas.eu. 
<< C                     .
F         Zoom on the Galileo-only positions obtained by using IGS data.
THE SECOND GPS III satellite is encapsulated in preparation for launch on August 23.
Ph
ot
o:
 Lo
ck
he
ed
 M
ar
tin
